Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper's If you ran experiments (e.g. for benchmarks)... (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main experimental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [Y es] See A.2 (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running experiments multiple times)? Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type Did you include any new assets either in the supplemental material or as a URL? [Y es] Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data you're If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects... (a) For a detailed description and intended uses, please refer to 1. A.2 Dataset Accessibility We plan to host and maintain this dataset on HuggingFace. A.4 Dataset Examples Example question-answer pairs are provided in Tables 9 10 11, . Example Question "What does the symbol mean in Equation 1?" Answer "The symbol in Equation 1 represents "follows this distribution". "Can you provide more information about what is meant by'generative process in "The generative process refers to Eq. (2), which is a conceptual equation representing Question "How does the DeepMoD method differ from what is written in/after Eq 3?" Answer "We add noise only to Question "How to do the adaptive attack based on Eq.(16)? "By Maximizing the loss in Eq (16) using an iterative method such as PGD on the end-to-end model we attempt to maximize the loss to cause misclassification while Question "How does the proposed method handle the imputed reward?" "The proposed method uses the imputed reward in the second part of Equation 1, "Table 2 is used to provide a comparison of the computational complexity of the "Optimal number of clusters affected by the number of classes or similarity between "The authors have addressed this concern by including a new experiment in Table 4 of Question "Can you clarify the values represented in Table 1?" Answer "The values in Table 1 represent the number of evasions, which shows the attack "The experiments in table 1 do not seem to favor the proposed method much; softmax Can the authors explain why this might be the case?" Answer "The proposed method reduces to empirical risk minimization with a proper loss, and However, the authors hope that addressing concerns about the method's theoretical Question "Does the first row of Table 2 correspond to the offline method?"

AI workers said they distrust the models they work on because of a consistent emphasis on rapid turnaround time at the expense of quality. AI workers said they distrust the models they work on because of a consistent emphasis on rapid turnaround time at the expense of quality. K rista Pawloski remembers the single defining moment that shaped her opinion on the ethics of artificial intelligence . As an AI worker on Amazon Mechanical Turk - a marketplace that allows companies to hire workers to perform tasks like entering data or matching an AI prompt with its output - Pawloski spends her time moderating and assessing the quality of AI-generated text, images and videos, as well as some factchecking. Roughly two years ago, while working from home at her dining room table, she took up a job designating tweets as racist or not. When she was presented with a tweet that read "Listen to that mooncricket sing", she almost clicked on the "no" button before deciding to check the meaning of the word "mooncricket", which, to her surprise, was a racial slur against Black Americans.

Crowdsourcing has gained immense popularity in machine learning applications for obtaining large amounts of labeled data. Crowdsourcing is cheap and fast, but suffers from the problem of low-quality data. To address this fundamental challenge in crowdsourcing, we propose a simple payment mechanism to incentivize workers to answer only the questions that they are sure of and skip the rest. We show that surprisingly, under a mild and natural "no-free-lunch" requirement, this mechanism is the one and only incentive-compatible payment mechanism possible. We also show that among all possible incentive-compatible mechanisms (that may or may not satisfy no-free-lunch), our mechanism makes the smallest possible payment to spammers. Interestingly, this unique mechanism takes a "multiplicative" form. The simplicity of the mechanism is an added benefit. In preliminary experiments involving over several hundred workers, we observe a significant reduction in the error rates under our unique mechanism for the same or lower monetary expenditure.

On TikTok, Reddit, and elsewhere, posts are popping up from users claiming they're making 20 per hour--or more--completing small tasks in their spare time on sites such as DataAnnotation.tech, As companies have rushed to build AI models, the demand for "data annotation" and "data labeling" work has increased. Workers complete tasks such as writing and coding, which tech companies then use to develop artificial intelligence systems, which are trained using large numbers of example data points. Some models require all of their input data to be labeled by humans, a technique referred to as "supervised learning." And while "unsupervised learning," in which AI models are fed unlabeled data, is becoming increasingly popular, AI systems trained using unsupervised learning still often require a final step involving data labeled by humans.

Biased labelers are a systemic problem in crowdsourcing, and a comprehensive toolbox for handling their responses is still being developed. A typical crowdsourcing application can be divided into three steps: data collection, data curation, and learning. At present these steps are often treated separately. We present Bayesian Bias Mitigation for Crowdsourcing (BBMC), a Bayesian model to unify all three. Most data curation methods account for the effects of labeler bias by modeling all labels as coming from a single latent truth.

Crowdsourcing has gained immense popularity in machine learning applications for obtaining large amounts of labeled data. Crowdsourcing is cheap and fast, but suffers from the problem of low-quality data. To address this fundamental challenge in crowdsourcing, we propose a simple payment mechanism to incentivize workers to answer only the questions that they are sure of and skip the rest. We show that surprisingly, under a mild and natural "no-free-lunch" requirement, this mechanism is the one and only incentive-compatible payment mechanism possible. We also show that among all possible incentive-compatible mechanisms (that may or may not satisfy no-free-lunch), our mechanism makes the smallest possible payment to spammers. Interestingly, this unique mechanism takes a "multiplicative" form. The simplicity of the mechanism is an added benefit. In preliminary experiments involving over several hundred workers, we observe a significant reduction in the error rates under our unique mechanism for the same or lower monetary expenditure.

For more details, please read our full paper, Crowdsourced Clustering via Active Querying: Practical Algorithm with Theoretical Guarantees, from HCOMP 2023.